‘One country two systems’ is an innovative constitutional arrangement designed by the late Deng Xiaoping for the purpose of securing the reunification of colonial Hong Kong with the motherland. The basic principles and features of the HKSAR under ‘one country two systems’ were specified first in the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984 and then in greater detail in the Basic Law of the HKSAR enacted by the NPC in 1990. The constitutional experiment of ‘one country two systems’ was inaugurated in Hong Kong in 1997, and we will celebrate the 25th anniversary of the establishment of the HKSAR on 1 July this year. At this conference today, I would like to provide a brief review of the basic institutional arrangement of ‘one country two systems’ and my reflections on its implementation so far.

The Basic Law was drafted on the basis of two basic principles -- the principle of Chinese sovereignty over Hong Kong, and the principle of Hong Kong's high degree of autonomy with Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong. The Basic Law provides for the continuity of the capitalist system and the common law based legal system of Hong Kong, and guarantees the rights and freedoms of Hong Kong residents. It also establishes the organs of government of the Hong Kong SAR and defines the relationship between the HKSAR and the central authorities. It confers on the executive, legislative and judicial organs of the HKSAR extensive powers. These powers cover a wide range of subject matters that include almost all policy domains with the exception of defence and foreign affairs. Even within the sphere of foreign affairs, the HKSAR is granted considerable powers over external affairs. For example, the HKSAR can, using the name ‘Hong Kong, China’, participate in the WTO and in the Olympics; it can also enter into international agreements with other states on matters such as commerce, trade and investment, reciprocal recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards, and even extradition of fugitive offenders.

At the same time, the Basic Law also provides for the powers which the central government may exercise with regard to Hong Kong, such as the power to appoint the Chief Executive after his or her election by a local Election Committee, the power to apply national laws to Hong Kong on matters outside Hong Kong's autonomy, and the power to interpret and amend the Basic Law.

The Basic Law also contains two important provisions which, in retrospect, shaped post-1997 developments in the HKSAR and gave rise to significant problems in the course of the implementation of the Basic Law. The first provision is article 23, which both requires and empowers the HKSAR to make laws to protect China’s national security, such as laws on treason, secession, subversion, sedition, etc.

The second provision in the Basic Law which has far-reaching implications is that which regulates the direction of development of Hong Kong's political system. Although the colonial political system was by no means democratic, the draftsmen of the Basic Law responded positively to the aspirations for democratization expressed by many people in Hong Kong during the consultative process for the drafting of the Basic Law in the late 1980s. Thus although the Basic Law provides that the Chief Executive would be elected by an Election Committee and the legislature would be elected partly by functional constituencies, partly by the Election Committee and partly by universal suffrage at the time of the establishment of the HKSAR, it also provides that the ultimate direction of development of the political system would be towards the realization of universal suffrage in the election of the Chief Executive and of all legislators.

As is well known, the Hong Kong government’s attempt to legislate to implement article 23 failed in 2003 because of strong public opposition led by the ‘pan-democrats’, and the issue of national security legislation became so politically sensitive and such a cause for concern and phobia that none of the Chief Executives since 2005 took any step to legislate on article 23.

Meanwhile, the Basic Law provisions on universal suffrage gave rise to aspirations for further democratization in post-1997 Hong Kong. The ‘pan-democratic’ political parties, which had the support of more than half of Hong Kong's voters in successive LegCo elections, lobbied for the speedy introduction of universal suffrage. But when the Chinese and Hong Kong governments finally put forward a model for the election of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage in accordance with article 45 of the Basic Law, the electoral reform plan was opposed by the ‘Occupy Central’ movement in 2014 and eventually rejected by the ‘pan-democrats’ in the legislature in 2015.

Growing dissatisfaction and increasing political conflicts in the HKSAR culminated in the anti-extradition bill movement of 2019 which, as is well known, resulted in many months of riots and civil unrest that persisted despite the suspension and subsequent withdrawal of the extradition bill. Some of the protesters even engaged in acts of violence that challenged the ‘one country’ principle of ‘one country, two systems’. The central authorities considered the social movement akin to ‘color revolutions’ elsewhere that were supported by Western states, and decided that the loophole in Hong Kong's legal system regarding the lack of protection of national security needed to be plugged. Hence the enactment of the National Security Law in 2020. The central authorities then took steps in 2021 to reform the electoral system provided for in Annexes I and II of the Basic Law. The declared purpose of the reform was to provide institutional safeguards for the realization of the principle of ‘patriots ruling Hong Kong’, first enunciated by Deng Xiaoping in the late 1980s. It was hoped that this reform would put an end to the political instability and conflicts, chronic filibuster in the legislature and frequent anti-China mobilization of the public that have plagued post-1997 Hong Kong for years and prevented the original design of effective executive-led government from being realized.

Local and overseas critics of Beijing’s policy towards Hong Kong have accused the central authorities of reneging on the promise of ‘one country two systems’ and democratization. These criticisms are not justified. I believe that the central authorities were well-intentioned both when the Basic Law was drafted and in the course of the implementation of the Basic Law.

For example, at the time of the drafting of the Basic Law, it was considered that the Chinese laws on matters of national security, which were those that prohibited ‘counter-revolutionary activities’, were not suitable for application to the HKSAR in which socialism would not be practiced. Hence article 23 was inserted into the Basic Law, requiring the HKSAR to make its own laws to protect China's national security. In 2003, the introduction by the HKSAR government of a national security bill was for the purpose of performing Hong Kong’s constitutional duty under article 23. The bill was actually certified by Lord Pannick QC, a leading British legal expert on human rights, as being consistent with the international human rights standards in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Yet the political opposition in Hong Kong demonized the bill and mobilized public opposition to it, which resulted eventually in the bill being withdrawn. Despite this, the central authorities continued to respect Hong Kong’s autonomy and had not issued any directive to subsequent Chief Executives to revive the legislative exercise on article 23 at any specific point in time. On the contrary, Beijing agreed in 2007 to set a timetable for the realization of universal suffrage in the HKSAR, even before the HKSAR had discharged its constitutional obligation to legislate on article 23.

I believe that the central authorities were also well-intentioned when they in the year 2014 put forward a electoral model for election of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage. Unfortunately, the electoral reform failed to materialize as a result of opposition by the Occupy Central Movement and the pan-democrats in the Legislative Council. They opposed the reform on the ground that the proposed nomination procedure for candidates were not democratic enough. They turned a blind eye to the fact that article 45 of the Basic Law provides expressly that candidates for election of the CE by universal suffrage should be nominated by a nominating committee, and the model put forward by the Chinese government of nomination of candidates by a nomination committee was fully consistent with article 45.

After the failure of the electoral reform of 2015, some opposition politicians and activists were radicalized and began to challenge or deviate from the ‘one country principle’ of One Country Two Systems. They even resorted to large-scale and unrelenting violence during the anti-extradition bill movement. In response to these circumstances, the central authorities introduced the National Security Law and the electoral reform of 2021, with the objective of steering the practice of ‘One Country, Two Systems’ back to its right track. Actually it was obvious from the circumstances in Hong Kong in 2019 that the train journey of ‘One Country, Two Systems’ had been derailed. Without firm and decisive actions on the part of the central authorities, it was difficult to see how ‘One Country, Two Systems’ could have any future. I think most reasonable people would agree that at this 25th anniversary of the establishment of the HKSAR, Hong Kong is better off than it was in 2019. Let us hope that the restored social and political stability in Hong Kong will continue, and that economic prosperity will grow further after the pandemic subsides. Like the other speakers at this conference and members of the audience here, I have hope and faith in the future of Hong Kong under ‘One Country, Two Systems’.